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Abstract 
 
This paper gives an overview of performing safety risk assessment of 
a safety critical operation with support of Monte Carlo (MC) 
simulation. The approach is outlined for an air traffic example 
involving aircraft departing from a runway, which is occasionally 
crossed by taxiing aircraft. At the airport considered, a Runway 
Incursion Alert System (RIAS) is installed to warn the air traffic 
controller in case of impending runway incursions. The paper 
explains the key issues to be mastered in performing a MC 
simulation supported safety risk assessment of this kind of operation. 
To begin with, one has to develop an appropriate simulation model, 
and a sound way to speed up the MC simulation based on this model. 
Complementary, one has to validate the simulation model versus the 
real operation, and the simulation supported approach has to be 
embedded within the safety risk assessment of the total operation. 
For this application example MC simulation results are given and the 
way of feedback to the design of the operation is outlined. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Among the class of complex and safety critical industries, air traffic is an interesting 
example that poses exceptional challenges to advanced design. By its very nature, 
each aircraft has its own crew, and each crew is communicating with several human 
operators in different air traffic management (ATM) and airline operational control 
(AOC) centres on the ground in order to timely receive instructions critical to a safe 
flight. In addition, from an organisational perspective, air traffic involves 
interactions between many stake holders: pilots, air traffic controllers, airline 
operation centres, airport authorities, government regulators and the public 
travelling. Figure 1 highlights this characteristic feature of interplay between 
distributed decision making and safety criticality both for air traffic and for other 
complex or safety-critical industries, such as finance and nuclear and chemical 
plants. Among the safety critical industries, air traffic stands out regarding the many 
distributed levels of interactions in control and decision making. 
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Figure 1: Air traffic compared with other complex and/or safety-critical industries in terms of 
potential number of fatalities per accident and the level of distributed interactions 
 
The implication is that safety of air traffic is the result of interactions between 
multiple human operators, procedures (including spacing and separation criteria), 
and technical systems (hardware and software) all of which are highly distributed. 
Since safety depends crucially on the interactions between the various elements of a  
system, providing safety is more than making sure that each of these elements 
function properly. It is imperative to understand the safety impact of these 
interactions, particularly in relation to non-nominal situations.  
Traditional ATM design approaches tend to be bottom-up, that is starting from 
developing concept elements aimed at increasing capacity, and next to extend the 
design with safety features. The advantage of the traditional approach is that 
advanced design developments can be organised around the clusters of individual 
elements, i.e., the communication cluster, the navigation cluster, the surveillance 
cluster, the automation tools cluster, the controllers/pilots and their human machine 
interfaces (HMIs), the advanced procedures, etcetera. The disadvantage of this 
traditional approach is that it fails to fully address the impact of interactions between 
controllers, pilots and ATM systems on safety. 
A goal oriented approach would be to design ATM such that safety has been built in 
at the capacity-level required. From this perspective, safety assessment forms a 
primary source of feedback (Figure 2) in the development of advanced ATM 
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designs. An early guidance of ATM design development on safety grounds can 
potentially avoid a costly redevelopment program, or an implementation program 
that turns out to be ineffective. Although understanding this idea is principally not 
very difficult, it can be brought into practice only when an ATM safety assessment 
approach is available that provides appropriate feedback to the ATM designers from 
an early stage of the concept development (Figure 2). This feedback should provide 
information on which safety-capacity issues are the main contributor to unsafety.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Safety feedback based ATM design. 
 
For oceanic air traffic, the civil aviation community has developed a mathematical 
model to estimate mid-air collision risk levels as a function of spacing values in 
route structures (ICAO, 1988). This model is known as the Reich collision risk 
model; it assumes that the physical shape of each aircraft is a box, having a fixed 
orientation, and the collision risk between two aircraft is approximated by an 
expression that has proven to be of practical use in designing route structures (Hsu, 
1981). Apart from the approximation, the most severe shortcoming is that the Reich 
model does not adequately cover situations where interaction between pilots and 
controllers play a crucial role, e.g. when controllers monitor the air traffic through 
surveillance systems and provide tactical instructions to the aircraft crews. In order 
to improve this situation, NLR has developed a safety risk assessment methodology 
which provides safety risk feedback to advanced air traffic operation design. The 
resulting safety risk assessment methodology has been named TOPAZ, which stands 
for Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer (Blom, 2001a). Within TOPAZ, 
Petri net modelling and Monte Carlo simulation has proven to deserve a key role in 
modelling and assessment of advanced air traffic operations on safety risk (Bakker 
and Blom, 1993; Blom et al., 2001b, 2003a,b,c; Everdij&Blom, 2002, 2003, 2005; 
Stroeve et al., 2003; Blom&Stroeve, 2004). In this respect it is relevant to notice that 
the use of Petri nets has been shown to work well in modelling safety critical 
operations in nuclear and chemical industries (e.g. Labeau et al., 2000).     
The aim of this paper is to explain how the TOPAZ methodology effectively uses 
Monte Carlo simulation in safety risk assessment of an advanced air traffic 
operation. Emphasis is on how Monte Carlo simulation of safety risk works and how 
this is embedded within a complete safety risk assessment cycle.  
ATM design Safety/Capacity 
Assessment 
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This paper is organized as follows. First, section 2 provides an overview of the steps 
of the TOPAZ safety risk assessment cycle and for which step Monte Carlo 
simulation is of direct use. Next, section 3 provides an overview of how to develop a 
Monte Carlo simulation model of a given operation. In order to keep the explanation 
concrete, a particular example is introduced first. Subsequently section 4 provides an 
overview of key issues that have to be taken into account when using a Monte Carlo 
simulation supported safety risk assessment. Section 5 presents Monte Carlo 
simulation results for the particular example identified in section 3. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn in section 6. 
 
 
2  Safety Risk Assessment Steps 
 
An overview of the steps in a TOPAZ safety risk assessment cycle is given in Figure 
3. Although the cycle itself is very much in line with the established risk assessment 
steps (e.g. Kumamoto and Henley, 1996), some of these steps differ significantly.   
Decision 
making
Determine 
operation1
Assess risk 
tolerability6
Identify 
severities4
Identify safety 
bottlenecks7
Assess 
frequency5
Construct 
scenarios3Identifyhazards2
Iterate
(option)
Identify 
objective0
Operational
development
 
Figure 3: Steps in TOPAZ safety risk assessment cycle. 
In step 0, the objective of the assessment is determined, as well as the safety context, 
the scope and the level of detail of the assessment. The actual safety assessment 
starts by determining the operation that is assessed (step 1). Next, hazards associated 
with the operation are identified (step 2), and aggregated into safety relevant 
scenarios (step 3). Using severity and frequency assessments (steps 4 and 5), the 
safety risk associated with each safety relevant scenario is classified (step 6). For 
each safety relevant scenario with a (possibly) unacceptable safety risk, the main 
sources contributing to unsafety (safety bottlenecks) are identified (step 7), which 
help operational concept developers to learn for which safety issues they should 
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develop improvements in the ATM design. If the ATM design is changed, a new 
safety risk assessment cycle of the operation should be performed in order to 
investigate how much the risk posed by previous safety issues has been  decreased, 
but also to assess any new safety issues that may have been introduced by the 
enhancements themselves.  
The following subsections present the risk assessment steps of a TOPAZ cycle in 
more detail. Then it also becomes clear that Monte Carlo simulation plays a key role 
in step 5: assess frequency. 
 
Step 0: Identify objective 
Before starting the actual safety assessment, the objective and scope of the 
assessment are set. This should be done in close co-operation with the decision 
makers and designers of the advanced operation. Also, the safety context must be 
made clear, such that the assessment is performed in line with the appropriate safety 
regulatory framework. 
An important issue for setting the safety context is the choice of safety criteria with 
respect to which the assessment is performed. Depending of the application, such 
criteria are defined for particular flight condition categories (e.g. flight phases or  
sub-phases) and for particular severity categories (e.g. accident, serious incident). 
Typically, within the chosen context, these criteria define which flight 
condition/severity categories have to be evaluated and which frequency level forms 
the Target Level of Safety (TLS) threshold per flight condition/severity category.  
 
Step 1: Determine operation 
Step 1 serves for the safety assessors to obtain a complete and concise overview of 
the operation, and to freeze this description during each safety assessment cycle. 
Main input to step 1 is a description of the operational concept from the designers, 
while its output is a sufficiently complete, structured, consistent and concise 
description of the operation considered. The operation should be described in 
generic terms, the description should provide any particular operational assumption 
to be used in the safety assessment, and the description has to be verified by the 
operational concept designers. Typically during this step, holes and inconsistencies 
in the concept as developed are also identified and immediately fed back to the 
design team 
 
Step 2: Identify hazards 
The term hazard is used in the wide sense; i.e. an event or situation with possibly 
negative effects on safety. Such a non-nominal event or situation may evolve into 
danger, or may hamper the resolution of the danger, possibly in combination with 
other hazards or under certain conditions. The goal of step 2 is to identify as many 
and diverse hazards as possible. Hazard identification brainstorming sessions are 
used as primary means to identify (novel) hazards.  
In system engineering, the functional approach to hazard identification is well-
known. In this approach it is attempted to determine all possible failure conditions 
and their effects, for each function that plays a role in the operation, including the 
human operator tasks. Unfortunately, the approach cannot identify all hazards related 
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to an operation that involves human operators. An important reason for this is that 
the performance of air traffic controllers and pilots depend on their (subjective) 
situational awareness. From a human cognition perspective a particular act by an air 
traffic controller or pilot can be logical, while from a function allocation perspective 
the particular act may be incorrect. Such incidents are often called “errors of 
commission” (Sträter et al., 2004). An example of error of commision in the crossing 
operation is that because of the complicated taxiway structure, the pilot thinks to be 
taxiing far from the runway, while in reality, he starts crossing the runway without 
noticing any of the runway signs. 
Another well-known technique of hazard identification is the HAZOP (HAZard and 
OPerability) method. With this method, hazards are identified and analyzed using 
sessions with operational experts. At the same time, the experts come up with 
potential solutions and measures to cope with the identified hazards (Kletz, 1999). 
The advantage of HAZOP with respect to the functional approach is that also non-
functional hazards are identified during the brainstorm with operational experts. 
However, in applying HAZOP, one needs to take care that hazard analysis and 
solution activities do not disturb the hazard identification process, which could leave 
certain hazards unidentified or inappropriately “solved”. Leaving such latent hazards 
in a design typically is known to be very costly in safety critical operation. 
Based on the experience gained in using the hazard identification part of HAZOP in 
a large number of safety analyses and on scientific studies of brainstorming, NLR 
has developed a method of hazard identification for air traffic operations – by means 
of pure brainstorming sessions (De Jong, 2004). In such a session no analysis is done 
and solutions are explicitly not considered. An important complementary source is 
formed by hazards identified in previous studies on related operations. For this 
purpose, hazards identified in earlier studies are collected in a TOPAZ database. 
 
Step 3: Construct scenarios 
When the list of hazards is as complete as reasonably practicable, it is processed to 
deal with duplicate, overlapping, similar and ambiguously described hazards. First, 
per flight condition selected in Step 0, the relevant scenarios which may result from 
the hazards are to be identified using a full list of potentially relevant scenarios, such 
as for instance ‘conflict between two aircraft merging onto one route’ or ‘aircraft 
encounters wake vortex of parallel departure’. Per flight condition, each potentially 
relevant scenario is subsequently used as crystallisation point upon which all 
applicable hazards and their combined effects are fitted. If hazards are not 
appropriately addressed by the crystals developed so far, then additional 
crystallisation points are defined. The output of such crystallisation process is a 
bundle of event/condition sequences and effects per crystallisation point, and these 
are referred to as a safety relevant scenario. This way of constructing scenarios aims 
to bring into account all relevant ways in which a hazard can play a role in each 
flight condition/severity category.  
In order to cope with the complexity of the various possible causes and results, 
clusters of similarly crystallised hazards are identified. A cluster of hazards could for 
instance be the set of ‘events causing a missed approach to deviate from the normal 
path’. An example is given in Figure 4. It should also be noticed that the same cluster 
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of hazards may play a role in one or more safety relevant scenerios.  
Each of the identified hazards can be of the following types: 
• a root hazard (cluster), which may cause a safety relevant scenario; or 
• a resolution hazard (cluster), which may complicate the resolution of a safety 
relevant scenario. 
For an appropriate safety risk assessment, all combinations of root and resolution 
hazards have to be evaluated in the next steps. 
 
 
Cluster B
Condition
Event n
Event m
Hazardous
situation
Conflict
Cluster J,
ATCo resolution
Cluster K,
Pilot resolution
Hazards' 
combined effects
 
Figure 4: Example of a safety relevant scenario diagram. 
 
Step 4: Identify severities 
For each of the safety relevant scenarios identified in step 3, it is determined which 
of the severity categories selected in step 0 are applicable to its possible effects. 
Safety experts should assess which of the severities are applicable for each safety 
relevant scenario, by consultation of and review by operational experts. For each 
safety relevant scenario the effects and their severities depend on many factors, such 
as the conditions under which the scenario starts and evolves, the geometry of the 
scenario, and the possibilities of (timely) resolution of the conflict. Therefore, a 
range of severities may apply to a safety relevant scenario. If necessary, the 
structuring of the events in the safety relevant scenarios of step 3 are updated such 
that each applicable severity category is linked to the occurrence of specific event 
sequences. 
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 Step 5: Assess frequency 
Next, for each possible severity outcome of each safety relevant scenario, the 
occurrence frequency is evaluated by making use of an appropriate tree per safety 
relevant scenario. The probability of the top event in the tree is expressed as a sum 
of a product of probabilities of applicable conditional events. For assessing the 
factors in these trees, primary sources of data are operational experts and databases. 
Examples of databases are aviation safety databases, local controller reporting 
system(s), et cetera. For appropriate use of such data dedicated operational expertise 
is taken into account. Hence, important input for the frequency assessments is always 
formed by interviews with operational experts (including experienced pilots and 
controllers) who are as much as is possible familiar with the operation under 
consideration. Qualitative expressions are to be translated in quantitative numbers 
when the selected safety criteria of step 0 also are expressed in numbers. 
Complicating factors in assessing at once the frequency of a conflict ending in a 
given severity can be that there is often little or no experience with the new 
operation, and that the situation may involve several variables. This holds especially 
for the more severe outcomes of a safety relevant scenario, since these situations 
occur rarely, and consequently little information is at hands about the behaviour of 
air traffic controllers and pilots in such situations. For these difficult safety relevant 
scenarios it is logical to make use of Monte Carlo simulation of safety risk. This 
approach has three clear advantages: 1) the quality of the risk estimate improves; 2) 
it is possible to estimate a 95% confidence interval; and 3) once a MC simulation 
tool for a particular application has been developed it can be re-used for assessing 
safety risk for similar applications. The next sections explain for an example safety 
risk assessment by MC simulation. 
 
Step 6: Assess risk tolerability 
The aim of this step is to assess the tolerability of the risk for each of the flight 
condition/severity categories selected in step 0. First the total risk per flight 
condition/severity category is determined by summing over the assessed risk 
contributions per safety relevant scenario for that flight condition/severity category. 
This summation takes into account both the expected value and the 95% confidence 
interval of the risk summation. Next for each flight condition/severity category the 
total risk expected value and the 95% confidence interval are compared against the 
TLS selected in step 0. 
 
Step 7: Identify safety bottlenecks 
From the risk tolerability assessment, it follows which safety relevant scenario(s) 
contribute(s) most to the expected value and the 95% confidence interval of the risks 
that has been qualified as being not below the TLS. For each safety relevant scenario 
the hazards or conditions that contribute most to the high risk level or confidence 
interval are identified and localised during step 7. These are referred to as the safety 
bottlenecks. If desired, this may also be done for assessed risk levels that are just 
below the TLS. The identification and localisation of safety bottlenecks is important 
as it gives operational concept designers directions for searching potential risk 
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mitigating measures of the operation, and it gives the safety assessment experts the 
hazards and conditions for which the reduction of uncertainty has priority. 
 
3  Monte Carlo Simulation Model 
 
3.1  Active Runway Crossing Example 
The Monte Carlo simulation-based risk assessment approach will be illustrated for 
an active runway crossing operation. This example accounts for a number of 
interacting human agents (pilots and controllers). The runway configuration of the 
active runway crossing operation considered is shown in Figure 5. The configuration 
takes into account one runway, named runway A, with holdings for using the runway 
from two sides (A1 and A2) and with crossings (C1, C2, D1 and D2) and exits (E1, 
E2, E3 and E4). The crossings enable traffic between the aprons and a second 
runway, named runway B. Each crossing has remotely controlled stopbars on both 
sides of the runway. Also the holdings have remotely controlled stopbars and each 
exit has a fixed stopbar. 
 
Aprons
Runway B
Runway B
E4
E3
Holding
A1
A2
C2
C1
D2
D1
E2
E1
Holding
Aprons
Aprons
Aprons
 
Figure 5: Runway configuration of active runway crossing procedure. 
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 The involved human operators include the start-up controller, the ground controller, 
the runway A controller, the runway B controller, the departure controller, and the 
pilots flying (PF’s) and pilots not flying (PNF’s) of aircraft taking off and aircraft 
crossing. Communication between controllers and aircraft crews is via standard VHF 
R/T (Very High Frequency Receiver/Transmitter). Monitoring by the controllers can 
be by direct visual observation under sufficiently good visibility conditions; it is 
supported by ground radar surveillance. The runway A controller is supported by a 
runway incursion alert system and a stopbar violation alert system. The runway A 
controller manages the remotely controlled stopbars and the runway lighting. 
Monitoring by the aircraft crews is by visual observation, supported by the VHF R/T 
party-line effect. 
In the runway crossing operation considered, the control over the crossing aircraft is 
transferred from the ground controller or the runway B controller (depending on the 
direction of the runway crossing operation) to the runway A controller. If the runway 
A controller is aware that the runway is not used for a take-off, the crew of an 
aircraft intending to cross is cleared to do so and subsequently the appropriate  
remotely controlled stopbar is switched off. The PNF of the crossing aircraft 
acknowledges the clearance and the PF subsequently initiates the runway crossing. 
When the crossing aircraft has vacated the runway, then the PNF reports this to the 
runway A Controller. Finally, the control over the aircraft is transferred from the 
runway A controller to either the runway B controller or the ground controller. 
 
3.2  Safety Relevant Scenarios  
Prior to the development of a quantitative accident risk model for the active runway 
crossing operation considered, all risk assessment steps had been performed using an 
expert-based approach. In this study the following safety relevant scenarios were 
found: 
• Scenario I: Aircraft erroneously in take-off and crossing aircraft on runway; 
• Scenario II: Aircraft erroneously crossing and other aircraft in take-off; 
• Scenario III: Aircraft taking off and runway unexpectedly occupied; 
• Scenario IV: Aircraft crossing and runway unexpectedly occupied by aircraft; 
• Scenario V: Aircraft crossing and vehicle on runway; 
• Scenario VI: Collision between aircraft sliding off runway and aircraft near 
crossing; 
• Scenario VII: Aircraft taking off and vehicle crossing; 
• Scenario VIII: Jet-blast from one aircraft to another; and 
• Scenario IX: Conflict between aircraft overrunning/climbing out low and 
aircraft using a nearby taxiway. 
 
From this expert-based study it followed that of all identified safety relevant 
scenarios, for scenarios I, II and III it was difficult to assess the risk sufficiently 
accurate using an expert based approach. For these three scenarios it is therefore 
useful to assess the risk through performing Monte Carlo simulations.  
In this paper, we focus on the details of a Monte Carlo simulation accident risk 
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model for scenario II. In this scenario there is one aircraft that takes off and has been 
allowed to do so and there is one aircraft that crosses the runway while it should not. 
Taxiing along a straight line over one of the standard runway crossings (i.e., via C1, 
C2, D1 or D2 in Figure 5) is considered. 
 
3.3  Multi-Agent Situation Awareness in the Simulation Model 
The safe organisation of co-operation between pilots and controllers in air traffic 
depends to a large extent on the “picture” or situation awareness (SA) maintained by 
each of the pilots and controllers. When a difference, even a small one, sneaks into 
the individual pictures and remains unrecognised, this may create unnoticed 
miscommunication and a subsequent propagation and increase in differences 
between the individual pictures. Eventually the situation may spiral out of control, 
with potentially catastrophic results. Hence any mismatch between individual 
pictures forms a serious hazardous condition in maintaining a safe organisation. 
Many hazards identified for the runway crossing operation were of this type. 
Endsley (1995) has defined human SA as the perception of elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, 
and the projection of their status in the near future. Stroeve et al. (2003) and Blom 
and Stroeve (2004) have captured these perception, comprehension and projection 
notions of SA mathematically in terms of three components: State SA, Mode SA and 
Intent SA. They also extended this single (human) agent SA concept to a multi-agent 
SA concept for operations involving multiple humans and systems, inclusive the 
basic updating mechanisms of such multi-agent SA.  
 
Pilot Flying
i
Pilot Not Flying
i
S
SA
FMS
 iS
Start Up
ATCo
ATC
System
Aircraft
 iS
Departure
ATCo
Ground
ATCo
RWY A
ATCo
RWY B
ATCo
Pilot Flying
i
Pilot Not Flying
i
T
T A
FMS
 iT
Aircraft
 iT
 
 
Figure 6: Relations between agents identified for the active runway crossing operation. 
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As depicted in Figure 6, for the active runway crossing operation we identified a 
need to model 10 agent types (7 humans and 3 systems) and their interactions: 
• Pilots flying; 
• Pilots not flying; 
• (Each) aircraft; 
• Aircraft’s flight management systems (FMS); 
• Runway A controller; 
• Runway B controller; 
• Ground controller; 
• Departure controller; 
• Start-up controller;  
• ATC system, which we broadly define to include airport manoeuvre control 
systems, air traffic communication and surveillance systems, airport 
configuration and environmental conditions. 
 
3.4  Dynamic Stochastic Modelling 
The Monte Carlo simulations are based on dynamic stochastic models of all relevant 
agents. These simulation models are mathematically specified using the Dynamically 
Coloured Petri Net (DCPN) formalism (Everdij and Blom, 2003, 2005). A high-level 
overview of the agents modelled is provided next. 
 
Taking-off Aircraft 
The model of the taking-off aircraft represents the ground run, airborne transition 
and airborne climb-out phases and includes the possibility of a rejected take-off. The 
taking-off aircraft initiates its take-off from a position near the runway threshold and 
may have a small initial velocity. The aircraft may have diminished acceleration or 
deceleration power. Two types of aircraft are included in the model: medium-weight 
aircraft and heavy-weight aircraft. 
 
Taxiing Aircraft 
The model of the taxiing aircraft represents aircraft movements (hold, acceleration, 
constant speed, deceleration) during taxiing. The taxiing aircraft enters the taxiway 
leading to a runway crossing at a position close to the remotely controlled stopbar, 
with a normal taxiing speed or initiates taxiing from stance. The entrance time of the 
crossing aircraft is uniformly distributed around the take-off start time. The taxiing 
aircraft may have diminished deceleration power. Two types of aircraft are included 
in the model: medium-weight aircraft and heavy-weight aircraft. 
 
Pilot Flying of Taking-off Aircraft 
Initially, the pilot flying (PF) of a taking-off aircraft has the SA that taking-off is 
allowed and initiates a take-off. During the take-off the PF monitors the traffic 
situation on the runway visually and via the VHF communication channel. The PF 
starts a collision avoiding braking action if a crossing aircraft is observed within a 
critical distance from the runway centre-line or in reaction to a call of the controller, 
and if it is decided that braking will stop the aircraft in front of the crossing aircraft. 
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Further details of taking-off aircraft PF model are given by (Stroeve et al., 2003). 
 
Pilot Flying of Taxiing Aircraft 
Initially, the PF expects that the next airport way-point is either a regular taxiway or 
a runway crossing. In the former case the PF proceeds taxiing and in the latter case 
the PF may have the SA that crossing is allowed. The characteristics of the visual 
monitoring process of the PF depend on the intent SA. In case of awareness of a 
conflict, either due to own visual observation or due to a controller call, the PF stops 
the aircraft, unless it is already within a critical distance from the runway centre-line. 
Further details of taxiing aircraft PF model are given by (Stroeve et al., 2003). 
 
Runway Controller 
The runway A controller visually monitors the traffic and has support from a stopbar 
violation alert and a runway incursion alert. If the controller is aware that a taxiing 
aircraft has passed the stopbar, a hold clearance is given to both taxiing and taking 
off aircraft. Further details of the runway controller model are given by (Stroeve et 
al., 2003). 
 
Radar Surveillance System 
The model of the radar surveillance system represents position and velocity estimates 
for both aircraft. There is a probability that radar surveillance is not available, 
resulting in track loss. Radar surveillance data is used as basis for ATC stopbar 
violation alerting and ATC runway incursion alerting. 
 
ATC Alerts 
Two types of ATC alerts are included in the model: a stopbar violation alert and a 
runway incursion alert. A stopbar violation alert is presented to the controller if  
surveillance data indicates that an aircraft has passed an active stopbar. There is a 
probability that the stopbar violation alert system does not function, implying that 
there will be no alert. A runway incursion alert is presented to the controller if radar 
surveillance data indicates that the taxiing aircraft is within a critical distance of the 
runway centre-line and the taking-off aircraft has exceeded a velocity threshold in 
front of the runway crossing. There is a probability that the runway incursion alert 
system does not function, implying that there will be no alert. 
 
VHF Communication Systems 
The model for the VHF communication system between the runway controller and 
the aircraft crews accounts for the communication system of the aircraft, the 
communication system of the controller, the tower communication system, the 
frequency selection of aircraft communication system and the VHF communication 
medium. The nominal status of these communication systems accounts for direct 
non-delaying communication. The model accounts for a probability of delay in or 
failure of the communication systems. 
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4 Use of Simulation Model in Risk Assessment 
 
Once the simulation model has been specified, there are several important aspects 
that have to be taken into account during the preparation, execution and 
interpretation of the Monte Carlo simulations. This section explains these aspects. 
 
4.1 Does the Simulation Model Cover the Identified Hazards? 
During step 2 of the safety assessment cycle, a lengthy list of hazards, including non-
nominal situations, has been identified. These hazards contribute individually and 
possibly in combination with other hazards to the safety risk of the operation 
considered. Hence it is quite important to verify prior to performing the simulations 
that the hazards identified in step 2 of the assessment cycle are covered by the 
model. The verification process consists of specifying per hazard how it is captured 
by the simulation model. A special class of hazards is formed by the situation 
awareness related hazards. Table 1 shows three of such situation awareness related 
hazards and includes a short explanation how these hazards are covered by the 
simulation model.   
Table 1: Examples of situation awareness related hazards and their simulation model. 
Hazard Simulation model 
Pilots become confused about their 
location at the airport because of 
complexity of the airport layout. 
State SA of the PF of a taxiing aircraft 
is that its aircraft is at a location that 
differs from the actual location. 
Crew of taxiing aircraft is lost and 
therefore not aware of starting to cross a 
runway.  
Intent SA of PF is and stays taxiing 
while PF starts crossing the runway. 
RIAS is switched off by maintenance 
and controllers are not informed. 
RIAS working or not is not connected to 
Mode SA of controllers. 
 
Inevitably this verification of each hazard against the model will lead to the 
identification of hazards that are not (yet) covered by the simulation model. For non-
covered hazards the simulation model developers should consider to further extend 
the simulation model prior to performing Monte Carlo simulations.   
 
4.2 Parametrisation of the Simulation Model 
During the mathematical specification of the simulation model there is no need to 
bother about the correct parameter values to be used during the Monte Carlo 
simulation. Of course, this is addressed prior to running the simulations. In 
principle there are three kinds of sources for parameter values. The ideal source 
would consist of sufficient statistical data that has been gathered under the various 
contextual conditions for which the risk assessment has to be performed. In 
practice such ideal sources almost never exist. Instead one typically has to work 
with limited statistical data that has been gathered under different conditions. 
Fortunately there often are two complementary sources: domain expertise and 
scientific expertise (on safety and human factors). In the context of Monte Carlo 
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simulation this means one fuses statistical and expertise sources into a probability 
density function for the possible values of each parameter. Typically the mean or 
mode of such a density function is then used as the best estimate of the parameter 
value to be used when running the Monte Carlo simulation.      
 
4.3  Speeding up Monte Carlo Simulations 
Air traffic is a very safe means of transport. Consequently, the risk of collision 
between two aircraft is extremely low. The assessment of such low collision risk 
values through straightforward Monte Carlo simulation would need extremely 
lengthy computer simulation periods. In order to reduce this to practicable periods, 
five to six orders of magnitude in speeding up the Monte Carlo simulation are 
needed. The basis for realizing such speed-up factors in Monte Carlo simulation 
consists of decomposing accident risk simulations in a sequence of conditional 
Monte Carlo simulations, and then to combine the results of these conditional 
simulations into the assessed collision risk value. For the evaluation of logical 
systems good decomposition methods can often be obtained by Fault and Event Tree 
Analysis. Because air traffic operations involve all kinds of dependent, dynamic and 
concurrent feedback loops, these logic-based risk decomposition methods cannot be 
applied without adopting severe approximations, typically by assuming that 
events/entities happen/act independent of each other.  
The stochastic analysis framework, that has shown its value in financial mathematics 
(e.g. Glasserman, 2004), is exploited by the TOPAZ methodology to develop Monte 
Carlo simulation models and appropriate speed-up factors by risk decomposition. 
The power of these stochastic analysis tools lies in their capability to model and 
analyse in a proper way the arbitrary stochastic event sequences (including 
dependent events) and the conditional probabilities of such event sequences in 
stochastic dynamic processes (Blom et al., 2003c; Krystul&Blom, 2004). By using 
these tools from stochastic analysis, a Monte Carlo simulation based risk assessment 
can mathematically be decomposed into a well-defined sequence of conditional 
Monte Carlo simulations together with a subsequent composition of the total risk out 
of these conditional simulation results. The latter composition typically consists of a 
tree with conditional probabilities to be assessed at the leaves, and nodes which 
either add or multiply the probabilities coming from the subbranches of that node. 
Within TOPAZ such a tree is referred to as a collision risk tree (Blom et al., 2001, 
2003).  
 
For the active runway crossing example, the particular conditions taken into account 
for this risk decomposition are: 
• The type of each aircraft (either a medium-weight or a heavy-weight); 
• The intent SA of the PF of a crossing aircraft concerning the next way-point 
(Taxiway/Crossing) and concerning allowance of runway crossing (Allowed/Not 
Allowed); 
• The alert systems (functioning well or not); 
• The remotely controlled stopbar (functioning well or not); and 
• The communication systems (functioning well or not). 
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Based on the simulation model and the accident risk decomposition, Monte Carlo 
simulation software is developed to evaluate the event probabilities and the 
conditional collision risks, and to compose this with the help of the collision risk tree 
into the collision risk value assessed for the simulation model. 
 
4.4 Validation of the assessed risk level 
For operations as complex as the active runway example considered, a simulation 
model will always differ from reality. Hence, validation of the MC simulation results 
does not mean that one should try to show that the model is perfect. Rather one 
should identify the differences between the simulation model and reality, and 
subsequently analyse what the effects of these differences are in terms of bias and 
uncertainty at the assessed risk level of the model. If the bias and uncertainty fall 
within acceptable bounds, then the assesed risk levels are valid for the specified 
application. Otherwise one should improve the MC simulation model on those 
aspects causing the largest bias and uncertainty influence on the assessed risk level.  
Five types of differences between simulation model and the real operation can be 
distinguished (Everdij and Blom, 2002): 
• Numerical approximations; 
• Parameter values; 
• Assumptions on the model structure; 
• Non-covered hazards; 
• Differences between the real operational concept and the operational concept 
modelled. 
Thinking in terms of these differences makes it possible to consider the validation 
problem as a problem of making the differences specific, assessing each difference 
and its effect on the collision risk, and subsequently decide if this is accurate enough 
(valid) or not (invalid) for the purpose aimed at. The effects of differences on the 
collision risk can mathematically be expressed in terms of bias and uncertainty that 
has to be taken into account when using the simulation model assessed risk value for 
decisions about reality: 
• Bias.  The accident risk as defined by the simulation model is systematically 
higher or lower than it is  for the real operation.   
• Uncertainty.  In addition to a systematic bias, the differences between 
simulation model and reality may induce uncertainty in the difference between 
the safety risk of the real operation and the safety risk resulting from the 
simulation model. 
 
With this, the validation of a simulation based accident risk assessment has largely 
become a bias and uncertainty assessment process. Within TOPAZ, a bias and 
uncertainty assessment method has been developed which consists of the following 
steps: 
• Identify all differences between the simulation model and reality; 
• Assess how large these differences are, or how often they happen; 
• Assess the sensitivity (or elasticity) of the risk outcome of the simulation model 
to changes in parameter values; 
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• Assess the effect of each difference on the risk outcome, using model sensitivity 
knowledge and complementary statistical and/or expert knowledge; 
• Combine the joint effects of all differences in bias and uncertainty factors, and 
compensate the risk value of the model with these bias and uncertainty factors.  
 
The result is an expected value of risk for the real operation, including a 95% 
confidence interval of other possible risk values. If the bias or the 95% confidence 
interval of the combined effects, or the bias and uncertainty of individual differences 
is too large, then these differences have to be taken into account in the decision 
making process regarding the acceptability and/or further design of the operation 
considered. 
 
 
5  Monte Carlo Simulation Results  
 
This section presents collision risk results obtained by Monte Carlo simulation with a 
computer implementation of the mathematical model of the active runway example 
of section 3. In order to relate these results to an actual operation, a bias and 
uncertainty assessment remains to be performed; however, this falls outside the 
scope of this paper. 
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Figure 7: Contributions to the total collision risk by the simulation model for the cases that 
the SA of the PF of the taxiing aircraft is to proceed on a taxiway, or to cross the runway.  
 
5.1 Assessed risk levels 
Figure 7 shows the accident risk as function of the position of the runway crossing 
with respect to the runway threshold. The probability of a collision decreases for 
positions of the crossing distances further from the threshold. Figure 7 also shows 
the decomposition of the total risk for the cases that the pilot flying of the taxiing 
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aircraft either thinks to be proceeding on a normal taxiway (without being aware to 
be heading to a runway crossing) or where the pilot intends to cross the runway 
(without being aware that crossing is currently not allowed). The largest contribution 
to the risk is from the situation that the pilot thinks to be proceeding on a normal 
taxiway. The relative size of this contribution depends on the crossing distance and 
varies from 64% for crossing at 500 m to about 83% for crossing at 1000 or 2000 m. 
 
A more complete overview of the contributions to the collision risk is provided by a 
projected version of the collision risk tree in Figure 8. It shows the contributions of 
events related to the situation awareness of the pilot of the taxiing aircraft (Cross 
runway/Proceed runway) and the functioning of ATC alert and communication 
systems (Up/Down). The collision risk results in the leaves of the tree are the product 
of the probability of the event combination indicated and the Monte Carlo simulation 
based collision risk given the event combination. The results in Figure 8 show that 
the risk is dominated by situations with a pilot flying of a taxiing aircraft having an 
erroneous situation awareness and the ATC alert and communication systems 
working nominally.   
 
 
Yes 
Cross runway Proceed taxiway 
Up Down 
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down 
Up Down 
SA pilot 
taxiing a/c 
ATC alert 
systems 
Communication 
systems 
No Initial SA difference 
Total collision risk 
1.1e - 9 2.7e - 13 1.8e - 13 1.4e - 17 6.0e - 9 4.1e - 13 1.4e - 13 2.2e - 17 
1.1e - 9 1.8e - 13 6.0e - 9 1.4e - 13 
1.1e - 9 6.0e - 9 
7.1e - 9 <<7e - 9 
7.1e - 9 
 
Figure 8: Projected version of the collision risk tree for the active runway crossing 
example, showing the contributions to the collision risk for various combinations of 
events related to pilot situation awareness and functioning of ATC alert and 
communication systems. The values are for a crossing distance of 1000 m. 
 
5.2 Who contributes to safety risk reduction? 
Based on results of the accident risk model, it is possible to attain insight in the 
accident risk reducing performance of involved human operators and technical 
systems. Table 2 shows conditional collision risks for the situation that an aircraft 
taxies towards a runway crossing at a distance of 1000 m from the runway threshold 
while the pilot has the situation awareness to taxi on a normal taxiway. The 
conditional collision risks in Table 2 refer to cases where the model either does 
(‘yes’) or does not (‘no’) involve the indicated human operators actively monitoring 
for traffic conflicts. A risk reduction percentage is determined by comparing the 
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conditional collision risk with the situation in which none of the human operators is 
actively monitoring. In this case, a collision is only avoided by the lucky 
circumstances that the taxiing aircraft just passes in front of or behind the taking-off 
aircraft (case 0 in Table 2). From the results in Table 2 a number of model-based 
insights into the operation can be attained: 
• It follows from case 1 that 99.8% of the accidents can be prevented by the 
combined effort of all human operators and alert systems. 
• It follows from a comparison of cases 1 and 5 that in the normal situation that all 
human operators are actively monitoring, ATC alert systems (runway incursion 
or stopbar violation) have a modest effect on the achieved risk. 
• It follows from a comparison of cases 1 and 4, and cases 5 and 8, that the risk 
reduction that can be achieved by the tower controller in addition to the risk 
reduction of both pilots is very small. 
• It follows from comparison of cases 1 and 3, and cases 5 and 7 that the pilot of 
the taxiing aircraft has the largest capability to prevent a collision in this context. 
Thus, resolution of the conflict is most likely to be by the human operator whose 
wrong situation awareness initiated the conflict.  
Table 2: Risk reduction achieved in the simulation model by various combinations of 
involved human operators when the PF of a taxiing aircraft intends to proceed on a 
normal taxiway under good visibility (crossing is at 1000 m from runway threshold.)   
Case  PF taxiing 
aircraft 
 PF taking-
off aircraft 
Runway 
controller 
Conditional 
collision 
risk 
Risk 
reduction 
0 no no no 8.9 10-2 - 
ATC alert systems on 
1 yes yes yes 1.7 10-4 99.8% 
2 yes no yes 4.0 10-4 99.6% 
3 no  yes yes 9.4 10-3 89.4% 
4 yes yes no 2.3 10-4 99.7% 
ATC alert systems down 
5 yes yes yes 2.2 10-4 99.8% 
6 yes no yes 1.7 10-3 98.1% 
7 no  yes yes 1.1 10-2 87.9% 
8 yes yes no 2.3 10-4 99.7% 
 
5.3 Comparison against expert based results 
In the earlier conducted expert based safety risk assessment of the active runway 
crossing operation, it was concluded that both the pilots and the runway controller 
make large contributions to the prevention of a collision in the scenario aircraft 
erroneously crossing and other aircraft in take-off. In hindsight, it can be concluded 
that in the expert based safety risk assessment, the total effect of the pilots and the 
runway controller in preventing a collision turns out to be overestimated under good 
visibility condition. It is the simulation based approach that makes clear that 
although the runway controller identifies a good share of the conflicts, its 
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contribution to timely conflict resolution is relatively small. One significant part of 
the instruction issued by the runway controller appears to concern conflicts that are 
already solved by the pilots. And another significant part of the instructions issued 
by the runway controller appear to arrive too late for the pilots to successfully avoid 
a collision. Because of this, the effective contribution by the runway controller 
towards reducing collision risk is relatively small.  
 
6 Concluding remarks  
 
This paper has given an overview of performing safety risk assessment and providing 
feedback to the design of advanced air traffic operations with support of Monte 
Carlo simulation. The motivation for developing such a Monte Carlo simulation 
approach towards safety risk assessment was the identified need for modelling 
stochastic dynamic events and interactions between multiple agents (humans and 
systems) in advanced air traffic operations. The distributed and dynamical 
interactions pose even greater challenges than those seen in, for instance, nuclear and 
chemical industries (e.g. Labeau et al., 2000). The paper has explained the key issues 
to be mastered in performing a Monte Carlo simulation supported safety risk 
assessment of air traffic operations, and how this fits within a full safety risk 
assessment cycle. The steps to be followed in developing an appropriate Monte 
Carlo simulation model has been outlined, including a short overview of multi-agent 
situation awareness modelling, which plays a key role in the safe organization of  
cooperation between many pilots and controllers in air traffic. The paper also has 
explained the need for using stochastic analysis tools in order to develop the 
necessary speed-up of the Monte Carlo simulations, and has shown a feasible way to 
validate the simulation model versus the real operation. This assessment approach 
has been applied to an air traffic example involving aircraft departing from a runway 
that is occasionally crossed by taxiing aircraft. The results obtained demonstrate the 
feasibility and value of performing Monte Carlo simulation in accident risk 
assessment for safety relevant scenarios that are difficult to assess expert based, 
because of many interacting agents.  
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